The China Mail - Who wins and who loses in Syria?

USD -
AED 3.672499
AFN 66.737984
ALL 83.174731
AMD 382.481965
ANG 1.790403
AOA 917.000614
ARS 1429.731598
AUD 1.514922
AWG 1.80125
AZN 1.702368
BAM 1.680652
BBD 2.013396
BDT 121.748022
BGN 1.679195
BHD 0.376997
BIF 2945.252856
BMD 1
BND 1.295062
BOB 6.908049
BRL 5.335301
BSD 0.999643
BTN 88.664321
BWP 13.308816
BYN 3.397906
BYR 19600
BZD 2.010474
CAD 1.39445
CDF 2409.999865
CHF 0.801104
CLF 0.024242
CLP 951.010147
CNY 7.119503
CNH 7.13451
COP 3889.25
CRC 503.091154
CUC 1
CUP 26.5
CVE 94.752581
CZK 20.945601
DJF 178.009392
DKK 6.418235
DOP 62.587805
DZD 130.329513
EGP 47.559302
ERN 15
ETB 145.326837
EUR 0.85959
FJD 2.25895
FKP 0.743972
GBP 0.746285
GEL 2.720175
GGP 0.743972
GHS 12.346666
GIP 0.743972
GMD 71.999662
GNF 8669.837301
GTQ 7.659951
GYD 209.157741
HKD 7.780375
HNL 26.234636
HRK 6.47302
HTG 130.8037
HUF 336.320293
IDR 16548.05
ILS 3.257195
IMP 0.743972
INR 88.77665
IQD 1309.639916
IRR 42074.999635
ISK 121.540306
JEP 0.743972
JMD 160.001031
JOD 0.70897
JPY 152.7875
KES 129.202513
KGS 87.449836
KHR 4013.558973
KMF 424.000321
KPW 900.00029
KRW 1419.530026
KWD 0.30672
KYD 0.833076
KZT 540.094177
LAK 21677.843987
LBP 89517.917521
LKR 302.493137
LRD 182.45017
LSL 17.161748
LTL 2.95274
LVL 0.60489
LYD 5.436431
MAD 9.11022
MDL 16.968478
MGA 4468.064082
MKD 52.923117
MMK 2099.241766
MNT 3597.321295
MOP 8.014058
MRU 39.931088
MUR 45.420265
MVR 15.298106
MWK 1733.358538
MXN 18.332704
MYR 4.214503
MZN 63.850376
NAD 17.162559
NGN 1471.149966
NIO 36.784513
NOK 9.977915
NPR 141.851943
NZD 1.725645
OMR 0.384497
PAB 0.999729
PEN 3.441994
PGK 4.196579
PHP 57.977498
PKR 283.146033
PLN 3.65813
PYG 6980.550865
QAR 3.644793
RON 4.377701
RSD 100.72698
RUB 81.435988
RWF 1450.488265
SAR 3.750789
SBD 8.271757
SCR 14.849626
SDG 601.496166
SEK 9.43055
SGD 1.294775
SHP 0.785843
SLE 23.214972
SLL 20969.503664
SOS 571.315641
SRD 38.152503
STD 20697.981008
STN 21.051637
SVC 8.747508
SYP 13001.812646
SZL 17.15307
THB 32.580208
TJS 9.29738
TMT 3.51
TND 2.935684
TOP 2.342098
TRY 41.717101
TTD 6.788341
TWD 30.502299
TZS 2459.077992
UAH 41.452471
UGX 3433.830448
UYU 39.906678
UZS 12020.125202
VES 189.012825
VND 26350
VUV 121.219369
WST 2.770863
XAF 563.628943
XAG 0.020324
XAU 0.000248
XCD 2.70255
XCG 1.80166
XDR 0.700971
XOF 563.626521
XPF 102.482137
YER 239.000076
ZAR 17.153602
ZMK 9001.234506
ZMW 23.711876
ZWL 321.999592
  • CMSC

    -0.0300

    23.71

    -0.13%

  • RBGPF

    -1.4100

    75.73

    -1.86%

  • RIO

    1.4500

    67.7

    +2.14%

  • NGG

    -0.2700

    73.61

    -0.37%

  • CMSD

    -0.0700

    24.33

    -0.29%

  • GSK

    -0.1500

    43.35

    -0.35%

  • BTI

    -0.3800

    51.6

    -0.74%

  • SCS

    -0.0700

    16.79

    -0.42%

  • RYCEF

    0.0200

    15.41

    +0.13%

  • RELX

    0.4000

    45.84

    +0.87%

  • BCC

    1.9000

    76.42

    +2.49%

  • JRI

    0.0500

    14.12

    +0.35%

  • BCE

    -0.0600

    23.23

    -0.26%

  • BP

    -0.4500

    34.52

    -1.3%

  • VOD

    0.0000

    11.27

    0%

  • AZN

    -0.4900

    85.38

    -0.57%


Who wins and who loses in Syria?




In a dramatic turning point for Syria, the Assad regime has collapsed, paving the way for Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to seize the reins of power. This profound shift comes after years of civil war, international intervention, and internal political struggles. While the fall of one government and the rise of another might briefly end large-scale hostilities in certain areas, the implications for Syrians—and regional players—are complex and far-reaching. Below, we examine who stands to benefit from HTS’s ascension and who may face serious setbacks in the aftermath.

Potential Winners

1) Hardline Islamist Groups and Affiliates
As HTS consolidates its influence, other aligned Islamist factions may find opportunities to share in governing structures or expand their influence in regions of Syria. Local militias cooperating with HTS may receive political or financial rewards, as well as a certain degree of autonomy in the territories they help control.

2) Foreign Backers of HTS
Certain external supporters might see political or strategic advantages if their preferred groups are now in charge. These backers could influence the formation of new governmental institutions, policies, or trade agreements favorable to their interests.

3) Some Local Communities Under HTS Control
In areas where HTS had already established local governance—providing basic services and a semblance of stability—residents might see a continuation of order, albeit under strict regulations. While personal freedoms may be curbed, some communities might prefer an end to intense fighting over the chaos of ongoing armed conflict.

Potential Losers

4) Moderate Opposition Groups
Non-extremist factions that fought to topple the Assad regime could be sidelined, if not outright suppressed, by the new leadership. Political competition might be stifled, making it difficult for moderate voices to participate in post-conflict governance.

5) Ethnic and Religious Minorities
With HTS widely considered a hardline faction, minority groups—such as Alawites, Christians, Kurds, and Druze—may face persecution or exclusion from the new power structure. Discriminatory policies could lead to displacement, especially in regions already experiencing sectarian tension.

6) Civil Society and Human Rights Advocates
NGOs, independent journalists, and activists critical of HTS’s ideology may be forced to operate clandestinely or face severe repercussions. Freedom of the press, speech, and assembly could be further curtailed, limiting any meaningful civic engagement.

7) International Humanitarian Efforts
Foreign aid agencies may find it more difficult to operate under a leadership that has been labeled “extremist” by many nations. Bureaucratic hurdles, security risks, and ideological disputes may restrict the distribution of crucial humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations.


International Dynamics

Regional Powers:
Neighboring countries that once supported specific rebel factions might find their influence diminished if those groups lose ground under HTS rule. Conversely, regional actors that developed covert ties with HTS might gain a stronger foothold in Syria’s evolving political landscape.

Global Powers:
Western nations could face a dilemma: accept a de facto extremist-led government for the sake of stability, or maintain sanctions and diplomatic isolation. Rivalries between larger international players—such as the United States, Russia, and Iran—may shift as each decides how (or whether) to engage with HTS.

Humanitarian Concerns:
While HTS’s political agenda may bring an end to certain forms of internal conflict, Syria still faces severe humanitarian challenges. Millions are displaced, infrastructure is in ruins, and the economy remains fragile. Aid agencies worry that severely restrictive policies or ideological conditions set by the new authorities could hamper reconstruction and limit aid distribution, prolonging the suffering of ordinary Syrians.
Looking Ahead

The end of the Assad regime and the rise of HTS marks a new chapter in Syria’s ongoing struggle. For some, the new government provides a semblance of order after years of civil war. For others, it heralds tighter social controls, greater risk of persecution, and an uncertain future. How HTS manages governance, minority rights, and international relations will ultimately shape Syria’s recovery or further turmoil.

As the global community watches from afar, Syrians remain on the front lines of this dramatic power shift—some hoping for a break from ceaseless conflict, others bracing for a new and possibly harsher form of authoritarian rule. Only time will tell if HTS can stabilize the country and address the nation’s myriad challenges, or if Syria’s years of turmoil will persist under a different banner.