The China Mail - Operation Venezuela: Scenario

USD -
AED 3.672499
AFN 66.106128
ALL 82.462283
AMD 381.646874
ANG 1.790403
AOA 917.000218
ARS 1451.5372
AUD 1.50015
AWG 1.8025
AZN 1.700154
BAM 1.666106
BBD 2.015555
BDT 122.381003
BGN 1.665355
BHD 0.377017
BIF 2960.464106
BMD 1
BND 1.286514
BOB 6.930128
BRL 5.505597
BSD 1.000707
BTN 90.075562
BWP 13.139445
BYN 2.939776
BYR 19600
BZD 2.012659
CAD 1.371725
CDF 2165.000354
CHF 0.793755
CLF 0.022959
CLP 900.659919
CNY 6.996401
CNH 6.98295
COP 3773.39
CRC 497.073782
CUC 1
CUP 26.5
CVE 93.933689
CZK 20.630803
DJF 178.205423
DKK 6.371335
DOP 63.090461
DZD 129.560285
EGP 47.601804
ERN 15
ETB 155.306806
EUR 0.85307
FJD 2.273303
FKP 0.741981
GBP 0.745325
GEL 2.694982
GGP 0.741981
GHS 10.508067
GIP 0.741981
GMD 74.000174
GNF 8754.802491
GTQ 7.675532
GYD 209.36909
HKD 7.784305
HNL 26.382819
HRK 6.4224
HTG 130.968506
HUF 328.157048
IDR 16694
ILS 3.18756
IMP 0.741981
INR 89.86355
IQD 1310.962883
IRR 42125.00049
ISK 125.580009
JEP 0.741981
JMD 159.029535
JOD 0.708968
JPY 156.986503
KES 129.090279
KGS 87.443501
KHR 4009.813693
KMF 420.000137
KPW 900.043914
KRW 1443.225013
KWD 0.30769
KYD 0.833994
KZT 507.398605
LAK 21633.571009
LBP 89616.523195
LKR 309.880992
LRD 178.128754
LSL 16.565363
LTL 2.95274
LVL 0.60489
LYD 5.41968
MAD 9.125364
MDL 16.842652
MGA 4593.353608
MKD 52.496226
MMK 2099.836459
MNT 3559.101845
MOP 8.023887
MRU 39.738642
MUR 46.24992
MVR 15.449944
MWK 1735.285849
MXN 17.98756
MYR 4.057939
MZN 63.909884
NAD 16.565293
NGN 1446.140218
NIO 36.826906
NOK 10.092298
NPR 144.120729
NZD 1.738475
OMR 0.384484
PAB 1.000716
PEN 3.366031
PGK 4.262823
PHP 58.925022
PKR 280.231968
PLN 3.603725
PYG 6569.722371
QAR 3.640127
RON 4.346101
RSD 100.058038
RUB 79.102728
RWF 1458.083093
SAR 3.750618
SBD 8.136831
SCR 13.647384
SDG 601.498074
SEK 9.228835
SGD 1.28664
SHP 0.750259
SLE 24.050318
SLL 20969.503664
SOS 570.932045
SRD 38.126498
STD 20697.981008
STN 20.871136
SVC 8.756506
SYP 11059.149576
SZL 16.560607
THB 31.608019
TJS 9.241824
TMT 3.51
TND 2.91815
TOP 2.40776
TRY 42.965502
TTD 6.802286
TWD 31.383051
TZS 2470.316036
UAH 42.338589
UGX 3623.089636
UYU 39.186789
UZS 12013.255301
VES 297.770445
VND 26300
VUV 120.744286
WST 2.776281
XAF 558.798674
XAG 0.013728
XAU 0.000231
XCD 2.70255
XCG 1.803607
XDR 0.694966
XOF 558.798674
XPF 101.595577
YER 238.449964
ZAR 16.599665
ZMK 9001.189445
ZMW 22.191554
ZWL 321.999592
  • SCS

    0.0200

    16.14

    +0.12%

  • RBGPF

    0.3400

    81.05

    +0.42%

  • CMSC

    -0.0111

    22.6723

    -0.05%

  • CMSD

    -0.0300

    23.1

    -0.13%

  • RYCEF

    0.1300

    15.58

    +0.83%

  • NGG

    -0.3600

    77.41

    -0.47%

  • RELX

    -0.3910

    40.719

    -0.96%

  • GSK

    -0.1850

    49.115

    -0.38%

  • BCC

    -0.1500

    73.64

    -0.2%

  • BCE

    0.2310

    23.801

    +0.97%

  • RIO

    -0.3740

    80.146

    -0.47%

  • JRI

    0.0000

    13.58

    0%

  • VOD

    -0.0190

    13.211

    -0.14%

  • BTI

    0.0950

    56.645

    +0.17%

  • BP

    -0.0800

    34.67

    -0.23%

  • AZN

    -0.3700

    92.14

    -0.4%


Operation Venezuela: Scenario




The United States has surged naval power into the southern Caribbean under the banner of “enhanced counter-narcotics” operations, while Venezuela has mobilized forces and militias at home. Against this backdrop, security planners are gaming out a scenario sometimes dubbed “Operation Venezuela”: a coercive campaign designed to capture or incapacitate Nicolás Maduro’s ruling circle without a prolonged occupation. What follows is a non-fiction analysis—anchored in current, publicly reported facts—of how such an operation would likely be built.

Phase 0: Political framing and legal scaffolding
Before the first shot, Washington would frame action as a transnational crime and regional security problem—drug-cartel interdiction, hostage/prisoner issues, and the defense of maritime commerce—while tightening energy and financial sanctions to constrict cash flows. Expect parallel diplomacy at the Organization of American States, quiet outreach to Caribbean partners for port and air access, and coordination with the Netherlands (Curaçao/Aruba) and Colombia on overflight and logistics. The immediate aim is legitimacy, basing, and intelligence sharing—without conceding that regime change is the objective.

Phase 1: Maritime and air “quarantine,” intelligence dominance
With destroyers, a cruiser, and an amphibious assault ship already in theater, the opening move would be sea control: persistent patrols, air and surface interdictions, and boarding of suspect craft outside Venezuelan territorial waters. Overhead, ISR aircraft and space-based assets would build a detailed picture of Venezuelan command-and-control, air defenses, and leadership movements. Electronic warfare and cyber units would probe networks, map radar coverage, and seed access for later disruption.

Phase 2: Blinding the air defenses (SEAD/DEAD)
Any kinetic step ashore would first require suppressing Venezuela’s layered air defenses, which include long-range S-300-class systems, medium-range batteries, and a radar network anchored around key urban and oil-infrastructure hubs. The likely playbook: stand-off jamming, decoys, cyber effects against air-defense command nodes, and precision strikes on select radars and launchers. The objective isn’t to raze the entire integrated air defense system, but to carve a time-limited corridor for special operations aviation and maritime helicopters.

Phase 3: “Decapitation” raids and denial of escape
If the operation sought to detain Maduro or senior figures, special mission units would move near-simultaneously against leadership safe sites, communications hubs, and key airports (to deny flight). Maritime teams could sabotage executive transport and pier-side escape options, while airborne elements secure runways for short windows. The template is historical: neutralize mobility, isolate the inner circle, exploit surprise—and exfiltrate quickly if the political costs spike.

Phase 4: Precision punishment without invasion
Should detention prove unworkable, an intermediate option is calibrated strikes against regime-critical assets: intelligence headquarters, military logistics depots, and select revenue nodes tied to illicit finance—while avoiding broad infrastructure damage. This keeps the campaign within days, not months, and reduces the risk of urban combat in Caracas or Maracaibo.

What could go wrong
Air denial is not trivial. Even a partially functional S-300 umbrella complicates rotary-wing ingress near the capital. Urban complexity. Caracas favors defenders; militias and security services could draw raids into dense neighborhoods. External spoilers. Advisers from partner states, and offshore intelligence support to Caracas, can raise the cost and duration of any action. Regional blowback. Mexico and others oppose foreign intervention; without a clear regional mandate, sustained operations risk isolating Washington diplomatically. Oil shock and migration. Renewed sanctions and kinetic action could squeeze supplies and push new refugee flows toward Colombia, Brazil, and the Caribbean.

Signals to watch if the crisis escalates
- Additional amphibious shipping or Marine aviation assets entering the theater.
- Surge of aerial refueling tankers and electronic-attack aircraft to forward locations.
- Cyber disruptions at Venezuelan ministries, state media, or airport systems.
- “Maritime safety” notices suggesting wider exclusion zones off the Venezuelan coast.
- Expanded coordination cells announced by U.S. Southern Command with regional partners.

Bottom line
The most plausible U.S. approach is coercive capture—short, sharp, and intelligence-led—nested inside a broader maritime and sanctions squeeze. A full-scale invasion is unlikely and unnecessary for the campaign’s immediate aims. Yet even a limited raid carries real risks: air-defense attrition, urban friction, regional polarization, and economic blowback. In crisis management terms, the escalatory ladder is crowded—and every rung is slippery.