The China Mail - Who wins and who loses in Syria?

USD -
AED 3.67232
AFN 69.582255
ALL 84.918051
AMD 381.989449
ANG 1.789623
AOA 916.00015
ARS 1182.2858
AUD 1.538746
AWG 1.8025
AZN 1.701725
BAM 1.695631
BBD 2.013828
BDT 121.888099
BGN 1.69545
BHD 0.377101
BIF 2969.77342
BMD 1
BND 1.281021
BOB 6.892456
BRL 5.546602
BSD 0.997429
BTN 85.827608
BWP 13.406562
BYN 3.264022
BYR 19600
BZD 2.003511
CAD 1.358395
CDF 2877.000247
CHF 0.811405
CLF 0.024433
CLP 937.593041
CNY 7.181597
CNH 7.184425
COP 4133.49
CRC 502.750432
CUC 1
CUP 26.5
CVE 95.597064
CZK 21.462983
DJF 177.611132
DKK 6.45438
DOP 58.90997
DZD 130.113113
EGP 50.609904
ERN 15
ETB 134.56173
EUR 0.86534
FJD 2.24575
FKP 0.736284
GBP 0.73676
GEL 2.739779
GGP 0.736284
GHS 10.273661
GIP 0.736284
GMD 70.49708
GNF 8642.729885
GTQ 7.664931
GYD 208.681027
HKD 7.84968
HNL 26.032225
HRK 6.518029
HTG 130.80701
HUF 348.181496
IDR 16295.1
ILS 3.55795
IMP 0.736284
INR 86.075902
IQD 1306.607597
IRR 42099.999706
ISK 124.579968
JEP 0.736284
JMD 159.696905
JOD 0.70899
JPY 144.043002
KES 128.867253
KGS 87.450149
KHR 3999.323765
KMF 426.533153
KPW 900
KRW 1361.069844
KWD 0.30593
KYD 0.831155
KZT 511.588995
LAK 21520.375564
LBP 89366.224962
LKR 298.647987
LRD 199.484167
LSL 17.949916
LTL 2.95274
LVL 0.60489
LYD 5.44962
MAD 9.119803
MDL 17.080413
MGA 4503.821096
MKD 53.236364
MMK 2099.907788
MNT 3581.247911
MOP 8.063844
MRU 39.597557
MUR 45.490459
MVR 15.405002
MWK 1729.48464
MXN 18.92442
MYR 4.244008
MZN 63.950363
NAD 17.949916
NGN 1545.490059
NIO 36.70711
NOK 9.900605
NPR 137.326554
NZD 1.659076
OMR 0.384498
PAB 0.997455
PEN 3.600203
PGK 4.166612
PHP 56.502971
PKR 282.765147
PLN 3.693896
PYG 7958.560003
QAR 3.638523
RON 4.348202
RSD 101.402976
RUB 79.502451
RWF 1440.294076
SAR 3.754305
SBD 8.347391
SCR 14.228557
SDG 600.501551
SEK 9.49724
SGD 1.281215
SHP 0.785843
SLE 22.050262
SLL 20969.503664
SOS 570.036456
SRD 37.528023
STD 20697.981008
SVC 8.727692
SYP 13001.9038
SZL 17.938126
THB 32.458501
TJS 10.073996
TMT 3.5
TND 2.951358
TOP 2.342101
TRY 39.428965
TTD 6.763968
TWD 29.494965
TZS 2586.681991
UAH 41.37256
UGX 3594.480833
UYU 41.007946
UZS 12673.394368
VES 102.16696
VND 26091.5
VUV 119.102474
WST 2.619188
XAF 568.693783
XAG 0.027512
XAU 0.000293
XCD 2.70255
XDR 0.70726
XOF 568.693783
XPF 103.395062
YER 243.350268
ZAR 17.90752
ZMK 9001.199446
ZMW 24.112356
ZWL 321.999592
  • CMSC

    0.0900

    22.314

    +0.4%

  • CMSD

    0.0250

    22.285

    +0.11%

  • RBGPF

    0.0000

    69.04

    0%

  • SCS

    0.0400

    10.74

    +0.37%

  • RELX

    0.0300

    53

    +0.06%

  • RIO

    -0.1400

    59.33

    -0.24%

  • GSK

    0.1300

    41.45

    +0.31%

  • NGG

    0.2700

    71.48

    +0.38%

  • BP

    0.1750

    30.4

    +0.58%

  • BTI

    0.7150

    48.215

    +1.48%

  • BCC

    0.7900

    91.02

    +0.87%

  • JRI

    0.0200

    13.13

    +0.15%

  • VOD

    0.0100

    9.85

    +0.1%

  • BCE

    -0.0600

    22.445

    -0.27%

  • RYCEF

    0.1000

    12

    +0.83%

  • AZN

    -0.1200

    73.71

    -0.16%


Who wins and who loses in Syria?




In a dramatic turning point for Syria, the Assad regime has collapsed, paving the way for Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to seize the reins of power. This profound shift comes after years of civil war, international intervention, and internal political struggles. While the fall of one government and the rise of another might briefly end large-scale hostilities in certain areas, the implications for Syrians—and regional players—are complex and far-reaching. Below, we examine who stands to benefit from HTS’s ascension and who may face serious setbacks in the aftermath.

Potential Winners

1) Hardline Islamist Groups and Affiliates
As HTS consolidates its influence, other aligned Islamist factions may find opportunities to share in governing structures or expand their influence in regions of Syria. Local militias cooperating with HTS may receive political or financial rewards, as well as a certain degree of autonomy in the territories they help control.

2) Foreign Backers of HTS
Certain external supporters might see political or strategic advantages if their preferred groups are now in charge. These backers could influence the formation of new governmental institutions, policies, or trade agreements favorable to their interests.

3) Some Local Communities Under HTS Control
In areas where HTS had already established local governance—providing basic services and a semblance of stability—residents might see a continuation of order, albeit under strict regulations. While personal freedoms may be curbed, some communities might prefer an end to intense fighting over the chaos of ongoing armed conflict.

Potential Losers

4) Moderate Opposition Groups
Non-extremist factions that fought to topple the Assad regime could be sidelined, if not outright suppressed, by the new leadership. Political competition might be stifled, making it difficult for moderate voices to participate in post-conflict governance.

5) Ethnic and Religious Minorities
With HTS widely considered a hardline faction, minority groups—such as Alawites, Christians, Kurds, and Druze—may face persecution or exclusion from the new power structure. Discriminatory policies could lead to displacement, especially in regions already experiencing sectarian tension.

6) Civil Society and Human Rights Advocates
NGOs, independent journalists, and activists critical of HTS’s ideology may be forced to operate clandestinely or face severe repercussions. Freedom of the press, speech, and assembly could be further curtailed, limiting any meaningful civic engagement.

7) International Humanitarian Efforts
Foreign aid agencies may find it more difficult to operate under a leadership that has been labeled “extremist” by many nations. Bureaucratic hurdles, security risks, and ideological disputes may restrict the distribution of crucial humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations.


International Dynamics

Regional Powers:
Neighboring countries that once supported specific rebel factions might find their influence diminished if those groups lose ground under HTS rule. Conversely, regional actors that developed covert ties with HTS might gain a stronger foothold in Syria’s evolving political landscape.

Global Powers:
Western nations could face a dilemma: accept a de facto extremist-led government for the sake of stability, or maintain sanctions and diplomatic isolation. Rivalries between larger international players—such as the United States, Russia, and Iran—may shift as each decides how (or whether) to engage with HTS.

Humanitarian Concerns:
While HTS’s political agenda may bring an end to certain forms of internal conflict, Syria still faces severe humanitarian challenges. Millions are displaced, infrastructure is in ruins, and the economy remains fragile. Aid agencies worry that severely restrictive policies or ideological conditions set by the new authorities could hamper reconstruction and limit aid distribution, prolonging the suffering of ordinary Syrians.
Looking Ahead

The end of the Assad regime and the rise of HTS marks a new chapter in Syria’s ongoing struggle. For some, the new government provides a semblance of order after years of civil war. For others, it heralds tighter social controls, greater risk of persecution, and an uncertain future. How HTS manages governance, minority rights, and international relations will ultimately shape Syria’s recovery or further turmoil.

As the global community watches from afar, Syrians remain on the front lines of this dramatic power shift—some hoping for a break from ceaseless conflict, others bracing for a new and possibly harsher form of authoritarian rule. Only time will tell if HTS can stabilize the country and address the nation’s myriad challenges, or if Syria’s years of turmoil will persist under a different banner.